Friday, June 19, 2009
Lots and lots of storage!
Well, it just got cheaper, and a whole lot easier, for ordinary, regular alarm guys with dirty pants to add big massive gobs of storage to IP projects. I give you the DroboPro 8 slot hard drive enclosure. I got to take a look at the thing earlier this week, and let me tell you, it is just perfect for medium sized surveillance projects.
Basically, this thing is an idiot-proof hard drive enclosure that will accept up to 8 drives of any type and size. You can mix and match any 3.5" drive of any manufacturer and size without worrying about matching- just slot it in and the DroboPro just automatically configures the thing. If you were on a budget but anticipated expanding in the future, you'd just buy a few drives and add more as you go.
The aforementioned ordinary regular alarm guys will be relieved to know that no knowledge of the various flavors of RAID is required. They've got this thing called BeyondRAID, which should be called AutoRAID (feel free to use that, Drobo), because that's what it is. You throw a bunch of drives in there and the box figures out the best RAID configuration and does it for you. Even adjusts the RAID on the fly for you. It also automatically detects bad drives and spreads the data elsewhere, giving you time to replace the drive.
The user panel is simplicity itself- easy enough that even a Mac user could figure out how to run the thing. There are a bunch of ways to connect the thing. You've got your choice between FireWire 800, USB, or even Ethernet, meaning you can put this drive anywhere along your network.
What about the price? The price is simply awesome. The array itself is just $1,199.95. You can also get it as a kit with 4TB for $1,689.95, 8TB for $2,189.95, or 16TB (that's right! sixteen big, beautiful terabytes!) for a mere $3,189.95! Do we live in a wonderous time, or what?
Sunday, May 17, 2009
Explaining megapixel cameras and rectilinear lenses
Manufacturers have been pushing megapixel cameras for a while now. And, let’s be honest, they look super awesome. But is there an actual business case there? When the bean counters come around, can we justify the added expense past “but, look how pretty it is!”?
Some manufacturers have been telling us that you can use megapixel cameras to replace standard cameras. Use one megapixel camera to do the work of six or eight standard cameras, goes the argument, and save money on the installation. How does that work, exactly?
You gotta use rectilinear lenses, that’s how.
Here's the thing. I don't know how big of an area you are trying to cover, but I'm going to hope for the best and assume it's an indoors area with bright, constant lighting, with the camera mounted about 12-15 feet high looking at an open area (no aisles or displays or desks!) about 35 feet by 35 feet square.
Assuming this is the case, or similar, you may be able to get away with a 2MP camera and a 180 degree rectilinear lens (NOT FISHEYE!!!) for your dPTZ (digital PTZ- remember this term for later) camera. Basically, what you are trying to do is get a VERY wide picture, and then blowing up portions of the picture later, like they do on CSI. Unfortunately, on CSI blowing up a picture actually makes the picture sharper, where in the real world blowing up a picture means a loss in detail. Therefore, you need a very sharp camera, a great lens, ideal 24 hour lighting, and wonderful storage and compression protocols. The actual software is pretty simple and your existing DVR could theoretically do it using the zoom feature (if your DVR could handle such detailed pictures without compressing the hell out of them, which it can't of course).
Now since most CCTV or security people are unaware of the very existence of rectilinear lenses (but YOU aren't, are you, because your good buddy the CameraMan linked to the definition earlier in this rant), so most people wanting to set up a dPTZ camera actually use a fish-eye lens (or buy a camera with a fisheye lens already installed) and use fancy, sophisticated software packages such as the ones made by Avigilon, which actually uses a bunch of very sophisticated programs working together to 1) zoom into a sector of the fisheye picture (ie the easy part) and 2) flattening it out (the hard part). This is very cool, except for the fact that it doesn't quite work the way you need it to work because, well, the picture is still distorted, and a distorted picture JUST may give a jury reasonable doubt.
So just buy a rectilinear lens. The best ones are from Theia. They've got a choice of CS mount, auto iris (the SY125A), a CS mount, manual iris (the SY125M), and a C mount, manual iris (the MY125M). Expensive? Sure. The lens alone is nearly the price of a megapixel, non D/N camera... but worth it, if it replaces six or seven cameras.
Now, the other thing you gotta think about is: storage. This camera is going to eat up storage and eat it up fast, and I assume you need to store video for a goodish while because I assume you are a medium to high risk site because otherwise you wouldn't be using so many expensive cameras and such an expensive NVR package. So. Learn about RAID arrays and buy Seagate Baracuda SV35.3 series drives by the case. Have fun, and kiss your budget goodbye.
At this point, assuming you are still reading, you may be wondering why the hell you should get this setup- wouldn't be easier to just get a freaking PTZ and be done with it? The answer is no. Now, a rectilinear lens plus a GOOD 2 megapixel camera plus a boatload of storage is the same or even a little more than a normal PTZ plus a keyboard plus an encoder BUT dPTZ has an enormous advantage over traditional PTZ, and that is: you never miss any of the action.
Remember, if you point the PTZ north, and someone gets stabbed to the south, you are basically screwed (a technical legal term), but with a dPTZ setup, you are looking at EVERYTHING ALL THE TIME.
We usually only use PTZ cameras to supplement fixed, traditional cameras, but even then it is usually not practical to have full coverage. Proper use of dPTZ cameras could make true, full coverage a reality.
dPTZ is an operational concept and a design philosophy, not a product in a cardboard box. It
requires creativity and true understanding of how cameras work and experience in physical security. There will always be a need for true surveillance video experts to explain and implement solutions such as dPTZ.
More about rectilinear lenses here.
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
Where's the Bandwidth?
Some anonymous but obviously incredibly intelligent person wanted to install fancy, gee-whiz megapixel intelligent cameras in the subway system. It was to have auto-tracking, left-object detection, analytics, the whole nine. And while this person was writing up this job, he had a brilliant thought.
"Ya know, we could save a lot of money by using the existing fiber optic network already installed in the subway system. Whoopee! I'm a genius, just like Mommy always said!" Then he proceeded to split atoms with his mind while calculating pi to the millionth place. Because that's how he rolls.
The problem? The MTA had installed that fiber optics network in the 1980s.
According to a board document, tests on the cable showed that it had “many broken fibers unsuitable to carry the high bandwidth required” to transmit large amounts of data, which hindered the surveillance camera project. The document did not say how long it would take to replace the cable.
Wow. Just... wow. Who woulda thunk that 20 year old cable made out of glass and running underground in a tunnel carrying the worlds busiest mass transit system with hundreds and hundreds of trains rumbling past at 45 or so miles an hour might have had problems? I would have run a speed test or something, but that's just me.
That's not all. Appearently, there are serious problems with the analytics.
One of the officials who spoke on Wednesday said those problems involved the cameras’ ability to spot an unattended bag or briefcase left on a train platform or other busy area and then alert law enforcement to the possible hazard. That capability had originally been promoted as a major feature of the system, but the official said it had failed in tests. “There are too many people, too many things moving around in the system,” the official said.
Well, dang. At least that's not the biggest scandal in American municipal surveillance systems. That prize surely goes to San Fransisco, with it's 0.01 fps cameras. Seriously, reading this article, you get the sense that a drunk monkey working for ADT set up the system: Bad wireless connections, terrible motion detection protocols, poorly sited cameras, framerates so low you'd get better results with an army of sketch artists using notepads and pencils standing on every corner, they don't have enough storage space to save what little data they do have (a staggering admission; hard drives are so cheap they're practically free), and San Francisco law doesn't allow the police to view the cameras live or to move the PTZs. Also, the cops say they came up $200,000 short and had to dip into their operating budget to cover maintainance.
There's video, too. Watch it and weep. At least they're megapixel cameras with some nice resolution, and clearly they didn't scimp on the lenses. Too bad whoever sited that camera was a moron, because it should be a little lower to see the entire crosswalk.
Seriously, people, I know figuring out the cabling requirements are the least fun part of the job, but if you screw that up, nothing is going to work, okay?
Monday, June 23, 2008
Show me your papers!
Now, the rule is, if you want to fly, you have to show ID. You don't have to show ID to the TSA, but if you don't, you don't get to fly.
I guess this makes sense. This has the very salutary effect of weeding out the stupid terrorists who aren't smart enough to get a fake ID.
Above: Osama's most deadliest weapon.
Heaven forbid the terrorists ever get their filthy paws on Photoshop.
But what if you forget or lose your ID? Sat, you went to Vegas for a convention, and mysteriously and through no fault of your own the dealer inexplicably failed to stop dealing you cards and you had a big bunch of tequila and you are now missing your wallet and, also, your pants. So, according to the article, they'll give you the full business, which includes signing a piece of paper stating, under penalty of perjury, that you are who you say you are. They also give you a pat down and check your luggage- big hairy deal, they did that to me in the airport in Israel. The most interesting thing to me is that the TSA supervisor called a "service"- the DMV?- to answer personal questions. That's it. Sounds easier than getting a credit card. Not that you'd know it from the amount of whining in the story and the comments- you'd have thought they sent him to Gitmo.
Anyway. I guess my point is 80% of security is keeping the stupid would-be bad guys away from your target. This is important because 80% of bad guys are unnacountably stupid.
But, don't forget that the more attractive your target is, the more bad guys are going to want a piece of it. And 20% of them will be smart. And you can't play the laws of averages forever.
Tuesday, June 17, 2008
Feel Good Security
That's fine, although this really won't do anything to make us safer.
The Registered Traveler program is a scam, although in the spirit of fairness I should mention that I do not believe that Verified Identity Pass employees consciously realize this. If you've been in a US airport lately, you've probably seen them; the way the Clear program works is you give them your driver's license number, previous home addresses going back five years, SSN or alien registration number, and a valid credit card. They then run your info past... somebody, and then do... something, and, after taking your picture and biometric data (fingerprints and iris images, for what it's worth) and taking your picture and noting your two forms of federal ID, they give you futuristicy little card. All this for a hundred bucks a year, plus a $28 bribe to the TSA.
Now, anyone who's been stuck in security screening purgatory would gladly shell out $128 to get through it a little quicker. But that presuposes that there is some way to tell someone is going to be a terrorist before they actually, you know, terrorize somebody. And that doesn't work. Would they have caught Mohammed Atta with routine security screening, or even the kind of screening they do now? I doubt it. I've thought of a trillion ways to get past airport security just in the time I've spent on security lines. The only things that have made air travel safer since 9/11 is, as Schneier says, 1) locking cockpit doors and 2) the understanding of ordinary passengers that they may have to be prepared to fight back (which is what stopped Reid, after all).
Everything else is security theater. Clear isn't about making us safer. Clear is about making lines shorter.